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PASSION AND PRUDENCE: 1 RENT WITHHOLDING
UNDER NEW YORK'S SPIEGEL LAW
PETER SnmMNS'
INTRODUCTION
T justice Cardozo it was common sense that "... unless repairs in the rooms
of the poor were made by the landlord, they would not be made by anyone. ' 2
Forty years later we are still seeking an effective means of compelling landlords
to make these repairs. During this interval public concern has not waned, nor
has there been a significant change in the popular belief that bad housing is
responsible for many of the social and health problems of our urban slums. In
fact, there is considerable agreement with Michael Harrington's view that
"Housing is probably the basic point of departure" in a meaningful campaign
to reduce the impact of poverty in our society.4 But progress has been slow;
recently President Johnson reported that "some four million urban families
[are] living in homes of such disrepair as to violate decent housing standards."8,
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
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1. "The second most passionate human relationship is that of landlord and tenant."
Asch, J., in Fanchild Investors, Inc. v. Cohen, 43 Misc. 2d 39, 40, 250 N.Y.S.2d 446, 447
(Civ. Ct. N.Y.C. 1964).
2. Altz v. Lieberson, 233 N.Y. 16, 19, 134 N.E. 703, 704 (1922). This case established
that violation of a statutory duty to repair a building might result in tort liability for
injuries caused by the failure to repair. While it is true that this liability may induce an
owner, either directly because of fear of an adverse judgment or indirectly because of
increased insurance risks, to comply with statutory standards, this approach is outside the
scope of this paper.
3. Deteriorated housing is frequently associated with serious hazards to health and
well being. In the popular view "disease was prevalent in slum areas, accidents were fre-
quent, psychological and social disturbances were often attributable, or thought to be
attributable, to substandard housing." Wilner et al., The Housing Environment and
Family Life at v (1962). For an opinion somewhat hesitant about confirming the relation-
ship between physical environment and social disorder, see Dean, The Myths of Housing
Reform, 14 Amer. Soc. Rev. 281-88 (1949); Wilner & Walkley, Effects of Housing on
Health and Performance in Duhl (ed.), The Urban Condition 215-28 (1963).
In addition to possible physical and emotional consequences, it has recently been
suggested that the way in which the law handles problems of slum housing "instructs the
poor about the American legal system" and may be significant in attitude formation. See
Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66 Colum. L. Rev.
275, 285 (1966).
4. Harrington, The Other America 164 (paperback ed. 1963).
5. Special message to Congress on City Demonstration Programs by President Lyndon
B. Johnson, January 26, 1966. 112 Cong. Rec. 1101 (H. Doc. No. 368) (1966), reprinted
in U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, Feb. 20, 1966, pp. 76-77. Other estimates of the magnitude
of the problem are even more alarming. A leading housing analyst has recently stated:
It is fairly common, but depressing, knowledge that, despite the great wealth
of the United States, a large proportion of American families still live in housing
that is so substandard as to constitute a serious threat to health and safety.
According to the 1960 Census, fully one eighth of the country's urban households
occupy dwellings that are dilapidated or lacking in sanitary facilities . . . . As a
rough approximation, it appears that at least one sixth of our urban population
-over 5,000,000 families-reside in a slum environment.
Grigsby, Housing and Slum Clearance: Elusive Goals, The Annals 107, 108 (1964).
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While the federal government has demonstrated a new interest in urban housing
problems over the past fifteen years, and will probably play an increasingly
important role in rehabilitating our cities, it is likely that the states and local
communities will continue to exercise the most immediate pressure for the re-
pair and restoration of the existing supply of urban housing. 6 The recent enact-
ment of the Spiegel Law in New York state as section 143-b of the Social Wel-
fare Law is one such attempt to promote safe and decent housing for the poor.
7
Legislative findings accompanying the novel and highly controversial
Spiegel Law state the problem clearly and succinctly: 8 "The legislature hereby
finds and declares that certain evils and abuses exist which have caused many
tenants, who are welfare recipients, to suffer untold hardships, deprivation of
services and deterioration of housing facilities because certain landlords have
been exploiting such tenants by failing to make necessary repairs and by ne-
glecting to afford necessary services in violation of the laws of the state." 9 The
statute itself does not impose new duties upon landlords for the maintenance of
safe and sanitary dwellings; these requirements are set forth in the Multiple
Dwelling Law, the Multiple Residence Law and numerous local housing codes.
What the Spiegel Law does is provide an additional means of compelling ir-
responsible landlords to meet existing minimum standands for health and safety.
One might hope that property owners would adhere to these minimum standards
out of a sense of social responsibility, but as Milton Friedman has put it, "the
appeal to 'social responsibility' has little effect unless there is an iron fist in the
velvet glove."'1 The Spiegel Law, while not quite an "iron fist," most certainly
adds starch to the fabric of social responsibility.
Rent withholding by the welfare department is authorized under the
Spiegel Law whenever that agency discovers that a recipient of public assistance
6. For a discussion of current Federal programs which are available to assist local
communities enforce housing codes, see Note, Federal Aids for Enforcement of Housing
Codes, 40 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 948 (1965). Earlier Federal efforts are described in Foard &
Fefferman, Federal Urban Renewal Legislation, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 635 (1960) and
in Beyer, Housing and Society, Chapter 14, "History of the Government's Role in Housing,"
pp. 448-84 (1965).
7. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, effective July 1, 1962, as amended by N.Y. Sess.
Laws 1965, ch. 701, effective July 2, 1965.
8. The Spiegel Law is believed to be the first statute authorizing Tent withholding
by welfare departments. In signing the law, Governor Rockefeller commented that the
"bill . .. parallels a system now successfully operating in Chicago." Messages of the
Governor, McKinney's 1962 Sess. Laws of New York 3678. But the bill's author reported
that in drafting the law "there was no detailed information of Chicago practices ....
The idea for this law crystallized within me and my search revealed this procedure being
followed in Chicago without any force or effect of law." Letter From Hon. Samuel A.
Spiegel, Judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, November 24, 1964. (This
and all letters hereinafter cited are addressed to the author and are on file in his office.)
The Director of the Cook County Department of Public Aid has explained the Chicago
practice as follows: ". . . this agency does not refuse to pay a shelter allowance where
recipients are living in sub-standard housing. Welfare rents are not withheld until such time
as the Court issues a Mandatory Injunction against the landlord." Letter of January 8, 1965.
9. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1962, ch. 997, § 1.
10. Social Responsibility: A Subversive Doctrine, National Review, Aug. 24, 1965,
p. 721.
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is occupying housing accommodations in a building in which there are violations
of law deemed to be "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health."'"
As long as these serious conditions continue, a welfare recipient is given a
statutory defense to any action or summary proceeding for non-payment of
rent; he need merely show "existing violations in the building" in which he
lives in order to stave off a judgment or an order of eviction for non-payment
of rent. 12 It is expected that a landlord will act out of self-interest and rectify
the hazardous conditions which thus prevent him from collecting rent as it falls
due. When the landlord makes the necessary repairs and removes the hazardous
condition, he is entitled to apply to the welfare department for the rent which
was withheld, and the department is then able to pay it to him.
13
The "club of continued occupancy without rent payments"'1 4 wielded by
the Spiegel Law is not entirely new to New York state. Rent withholding has
been authorized, under appropriate circumstances, in New York City under
section 302 of the Multiple Dwelling Law and under the present section 755
of the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law1 for the past thirty years.
But now, for the first time, a rent withholding statute has been given statewide
applicability, albeit for a limited class of tenants. In addition to this accomplish-
ment, enactment of the Spiegel Law has important symbolic significance in
two respects: first, it represents at least tacit recognition of the failure or in-
adequacy of the traditional methods employed for enforcing housing standards;
and second, it is an implied acknowledgment of the inability or unwillingness
11. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(2). New York is divided into public welfare
districts, either by county or city each under the jurisdiction of a local welfare department.
N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 61. The mechanics of rent withholding are quite simple: in the
unusual circumstance where the Department has been paying the relief recipient's rent
directly to the landlord, the Department ceases such payments and notifies the landlord of
the reason; more commonly, the Department instructs the client to stop paying rent and it
reduces the client's stipend by the amount of the usual rent allowance.
12. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(5).
13. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(S). Additionally § 143-b(6) provides that "Where
rents were reduced by order of the appropriate rent commission, the public welfare depart-
ment may make provision for payment of the reduced rent in conformity with such order."
This is undoubtedly a reference to the authority of the Administration of the New York
City Residential Rent Control Law to reduce rents where there has been a reduction in
essential services which the landlord is required to provide the tenant. The reduction in rent is
also authorized where code violations exist. In practice these reductions are scaled to
reflect the seriousness of the adverse conditions. See N.Y.C. Ad. Code §§ Y 51-5.0(h) (2) and
(3). For example, in 1963 the Department of Buildings of New York City certified 1529
buildings to the Rent and Rehabilitation Administration for rent reductions. Griebetz, New
York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. Housing 297, 298 (1964). The view that rent control is
one of the causes of deteriorating housing is argued by Gale Johnson in Rent Control and the
Distribution of Income, Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association, May,
1951, pp. 569-82; and for a -popular treatment of this same question, see Siekman, The Rent
Control Trap, Fortune, Feb. 1960, p. 123.
The influential Committee on Housing and Urban Development of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York was unable to come to agreement on the effects of continued
rent control on housing conditions. For the Committee's Report, see 17 Record of N.Y.C.BA.
88 (1962).
14. This vivid phrase is from Dunham, Private Enforcement of City Planning, 20 Law
& Contemp. Prob. 463, 465 (1955).
15. Formerly N.Y. C.P.A. § 1446a.
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of the common law to develop suitable remedies on a case-by-case approach.
Before proceeding to a detailed consideration of the workings of the Spiegel
Law, brief comment upon both the common law background of the problem




Courts have been diverted from making any sustained effort to alleviate
the oppressive conditions of slum housing by the persistence of two anachronis-
tic fictions. The first of these fictions, that a lease operates as a conveyance
of an estate in land, derives from the medieval heritage of our land law.16
When land was used primarily for agricultural purposes it-was not unreasonable
for courts to conclude that what the lessee sought and obtained as the benefit
of his lease was the right to use and possess a given area of land for a
stipulated period of time. The presence of any buildings on the land, and even
more so their condition, was irrelevant to the transaction in the eyes of the
law, and this probably reflected the understanding of the parties. It thereby
became established doctrine that the lessor was under no duty to put any
buildings which might be on the land, including a dwelling place, into a
habitable condition for the lessee, and the lessor was not obligated to repair
any dilapidations which occurred while the lessee was in possession. 17 More-
over, the fiction that a lessee acquires only an estate in land has been so in-
fluential that even when the landlord is under a recognized duty to make repairs
-because he covenants to do so, either expressly or impliedly, or because a
statute compels him to do so-his failure to make necessary repairs will not
excuse the tenant from paying rent. Unlike the ordinary bilateral contract in
which covenants are treated as dependent, and a material breach by one
party will normally excuse the other party from performing, covenants in a
lease are treated as independent; so long as the tenant acquires the mere right
to possession from the landlord, he must perform all of his covenants, including
the covenant to pay rent.'8 It mattered not, at common law, that property
leased for dwelling purposes became totally uninhabitable; the tenant re-
mained bound to pay rent so long as he still had the right to possess the
premises.' 9
The second fiction which has tended to restrain courts from making a sub-
stantial contribution to the problem of housing standards stems from laissez-
16. For a brief history of this development see Holdsworth, An Historical Introduction
to the Land Law 70-73, 230-55 (1927); Simpson, An Introduction to the History of the
Land "Law 87-88, 229-38 (1961).
17. 1 American Law of Property § 3.78 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 Powell, The Law of
Real Property ff 233 (Recomp. ed. 1966).
18. Bennett, The Modern Lease, 16 Texas L. Rev. 47 (1937); Lloyd, The Disturbed
Tenant: A Phase of Constructive Eviction, 79 U. Pa. L. Rev. 707 (1931).
19. 1 American Law of Property § 3.78 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 Powell, The Law of Real
Property ff 230[31 (Recomp. ed. 1966).
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faire economic doctrines of the nineteenth century. According to this fiction,
courts are not called upon to perform any necessary social function in reform-
ing landlord and tenant law because the parties to a lease are fully able to
protect their own interests and to secure the terms and conditions which they
wish. If a tenant lives in an unsafe or unhealthy dwelling it must be because
he wishes to do so; if the tenant did not approve the condition of the premises
he would have bargained with the landlord for desirable repairs and improve-
ments before he agreed to the tenancy. Both landlord and tenant are free men
and both "stand upon equal terms [and] either may equally well accept or
refuse to enter into the relationship." 20 Quite clearly this self-regulating view
of the housing market overlooks entirely the question of the social costs of
deteriorated housing; there may be adequate reasons for denying to those
who "enjoy" unsafe living quarters the pleasure of their preference. 21 But
apart from consideration of any possible social costs, it is quite clear that the
supply of decent low cost housing has not kept up with demand in our large
cities22 and the competition for this housing is distorted by problems of racial
discrimination 2 3 However inaccurate it may be, the myth of the free market
in housing has long cast its shadow over the law of landlord and tenant, pro-
ducing a state of inertia if not one of indifference.
24
Innovation
This is not to deny that there has been, some judicial creativity in the
domain of landlord and tenant law.25 For example, the doctrine of constructive
20. Kirshenbaum v. General Outdoor Advertising Co., 258 N.Y. 489, 495, 180 N.E. 245,
247 (1932).
21. "Social costs are those borne, not by the one who incurs them, but by others. Thus
an individual creates social costs if the house he builds creates a drainage problem for which
his neighbors or the town must pay." Banfield & Grodzins, Government Housing in
Metropolitan Areas 78 (1958). That the "social costs" argument may be used to serve
selfish and ignoble ends, see Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation
of Chicago's Housing Supply, 31 U. Chi. L. Rev. 180 (1963); Haar, Zoning and Minimtm
Standards-The Wayne Township Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1051 (1953).
22. Grigsby, Housing Markets and Public Policy 22-26 (1963).
23. According to a report of a University of Chicago study Negroes pay a 15%
"color tax" in obtaining housing accommodations. Benedict, Civil Rights and Racial Unrest-
A Lawyer's Problem, 45 Chicago Bar Rec. 225 (1964); see Ferguson, A Brief Commentary
on Urban Redevelopment and Civil Rights, 9 Howard LJ. 101 (1963).
24. How the market actually functions, and its consequences, are described by
Catherine Bauer Wuster: "A severe shortage of homes is a many-sided evil. It harms family
life, restricts freedom and mobility, puts people at the mercy of exploitive landlords and
builders, hits low income families the hardest and those with children hardest of all, prevents
the enforcement of standards, and necessitates controls that disrupt the economy and are
almost impossible to administer justly." Redevelopment: A Misfit in the Fifties, The
Future of Cities and Urban Development 18 (Woodbury ed. 1953).
25. See LeBlanc, Landlord-Tenant Problems, in Conference Proceedings, The Extension
of Legal Services to the Poor 51-60 (U.S. Dep't Health, Ed. & Welfare, 1964) for
the observation that most "landlord-tenant law has been made by the lowest courts of
the state with very little guidance from the appellate courts." Id. at 54. Levi suggests that if
tenants were more often plaintiffs they would then be in a better position to persuade trial
courts to develop "new ways of grappling with old problems" and this would cause appellate
courts to become more involved in lawmaking because landlords would certainly appeal
RENT WITHHOLDING IN NEW YORK
eviction, essentially an attempt to introduce contract principles of mutuality
by indirection, is a judicial invention. 26 It has tended to make the law more
consistent with the fact that today most leases involve commercial or living
space and not agricultural land. Even at common law there was one situation
in which a tenant might be freed from his promise to pay rent: when the lessor
actually ousted the tenant from the leasehold estate. Conduct less extreme than
an actual ouster by the lessor may give rise to a defense in an action for rent
under the modern doctrine of constructive eviction. It is clear that a tenant in
an apartment building can be forced to abandon the premises by conduct on
the landlord's part which does not amount to an actual ouster. Failure to pro-
vide essential utilities, misuse of other portions of the building, or continued
refusal to repair an elevator, may make the tenant's position virtually untenable.
In such a circumstance, the doctrine of constructive eviction permits a tenant
to treat a serious interference with his use of the premises as if it were an actual
ouster by the landlord. The tenant may then vacate the premises and he will
be excused from making any further rent payments 27 Where a tenant is
obligated under a long term lease, or where there has been a significant shift
in the rental market or in business conditions, constructive eviction might offer
a tenant valuable relief from an otherwise unfavorable situation. Slum tenants,
though, are unlikely to find meaningful protection in this doctrine; 28 long
term residential leases are uncommon, and the requirement that the tenant
must vacate the premises offers little more than the alternative of quitting one
substandard unit for another.
Another judicial innovation in landlord and tenant law is the doctrine of
partial eviction. 29 There is a partial eviction whenever the lessor excludes the
lessee from some portion of the leased premises. This may occur either as a
refusal to permit the lessee to enter into possession of part of the leased property
when the lessee first seeks to occupy the premises, or as an actual ouster from
possession of a portion of the premises which the lessee has previously occupied.
Following a partial eviction the tenant is freed from all obligation to pay rent in
spite of the fact that he is entitled to remain in possession of any portion of the
premises from which he has not been ousted. This somewhat anomalous result is
explained as a corollary of the previously mentioned common law rule that
following an actual ouster by the lessor, the lessee is excused from all responsi-
adverse decisions. Levi, Focal Leverage Points in Problems Relating to Real Property, 66
Colum. L. Rev. 275, 284 (1966).
26. See the suggestion of a student author that courts use the doctrine of "constructive
eviction" in order to avoid the open admission that "they are dealing with the problem in
terms of contract principles .... " Note, 31 Calif. L. Rev. 338, 341 (1943).
27. Dyett v. Pendleton, 8 Cow. (N.Y.) 727 (1826); Rapacz, Origin and Evolution of
Constructive Eviction in the United States, 1 DePaul L. Rev. 69 (1951).
28. Even middle income tenants may not be able to benefit. See, for example, Powell's
comment: "It has been recently suggested that the utility of the doctrine of constructive
eviction as a weapon in the hands of lessees to compel lessors to do as they have agreed has
been eliminated by the housing shortage, which practically prevents a tenant from removing
when treated badly.' 2 Powell, The Law of Real Property ff 230[3] (Recomp. ed. 1966).
29. 1 American Law of Property § 3.52 (Casner ed. 1952).
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bility for the rent. In the case of such ouster from only a portion of the leased
premises, the lessor is denied the right to rent for the portion retained by fhe
tenant because he "is not permitted to apportion his own wrong."
8 0
By itself, the doctrine of partial eviction is unlikely to be of much assist-
ance to slum dwellers; there is no evidence that situations producing partial
evictions are at all common or pose a significant problem.8 ' One recent case,
however, has suggested that the doctrine might have considerable impact if
used in association with the concept of constructive eviction. In a constructive
eviction an interference by the landlord, short of an actual ouster, may be so
detrimental to the tenant's continued use of the premises that the tenant is
permitted to vacate and he is thereby excused from all liability for future rent.
If the facts giving rise to a constructive eviction were sufficient to satisfy the
requirement of actual ouster amounting to a partial eviction, the tenant might be
permitted to remain rent free until the landlord remedied the situation.
In Gombo v. Martise,8 2 which developed out of the New York City rent
strikes in 196'4, the trial judge ruled that the facts presented an opportunity to
find a "partial constructive" eviction. He reasoned that a tenant who was de-
prived of an essential service was as severely damaged as the tenant who was
actually ousted from a small portion of the premises, and he ruled that such a
tenant might remain rent free until services were restored. A lack of precedent
for such a determination proved fatal on appeal, but the analysis may some
day win judicial favor. In the Gombo case the trial judge had tried in this way
to institute rent withholding by judicial decree as a form of leverage to compel
the landlord to provide adequate services. It is not surprising that this initial
attempt at finding a partial constructive eviction failed. What is sorrowful is
that there has been so little judicial experimentation in landlord and tenant
law, and that the little which we have had has come so late.
33
30. Fifth Avenue Building Co. v. Kernochan, 221 N.Y. 370, 371, 117 N.E. 579, 580
(1917).
31. Fifth Avenue Estates, Inc. v. Scull, 42 Misc. 2d 1052, 249 N.Y.S.2d 774 (Sup. Ct.,
App. Term 1964) the tenant successfully raised the defense of partial eviction where
he had been excluded from one room in an eleven room luxury apartment. The rent
for the entire year during which the tenant had been kept out of possession was denied
to the landlord.
32. 41 Misc. 2d 475, 246 N.Y.S.2d 750 (N.Y. City Ct. 1964), rev'd per curiam, 44
Misc. 2d 239, 253 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Sup. Ct. 1964). This case was discussed widely in the
newspapers because of its importance in the New York City rent strikes. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 9, 1964, p. 1, col. 2 and Wall Street J., Feb. 4, 1964, p. 16, col. 4. The label "rent strike"
may be somewhat misleading, especially in its pejorative connotation. In most instances,
tenants did no more than exercise their rights under N.Y. Real Prop. Law § 755.
For a somewhat -related and equally creative departure see Judge Martin's opinion in
Pines v'. Perssion, 14 Wisc. 2d 590, 111 N.W.2d 409 (1961), in which the Wisconsin Court
refused to follow the existing common law rule and held that there was an implied warranty
of habitability in a one year lease of a furnished house. See also the dissenting opinion of
Judge Bazelon in Bowles v. Mahoney, 202 F.2d 320, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
33. While much of the current attention to the problems of slum tenants is associated
with the federal anti-poverty program, the concern for modernizing landlord and tenant
law is much older. Note, for example, Bennett's comment in 1937: "The task of modern
courts has been to divorce the law of leases from its medieval setting of real property law,
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LEGISLATIVE REFORM
Fortunately an assault upon deplorable housing conditions in big city
slums did not wait upon judicial innovation. 34 Reformers recognized that slum
tenants themselves lacked both the economic power and the legal authority to
compel landlords to provide safe and decent housing, and they turned to the
legislature for remedial action. Eventually some measure of victory was won
and laws were passed establishing minimum standards for certain New York
City tenements.35 Over the years this legislation has been applied to an increas-
ing number of dwellings in New York City and minimum qualifications for safe
and sanitary housing have been elevated.36 Similarly, in 1952, a companion
law was enacted to cover the remainder of the state.3 7 Under both of these
statutes local governments are authorized to adopt housing codes with more
stringent requirements which may be better suited to local needs and responsi-
bilities.3 8 Housing codes set minimum standards for existing buildings and thus
apply retroactively;3 9 the owner of a building which does not comply with
whatever standards the current housing code requires may be compelled to
undertake sufficient repairs and improvements to bring his building into com-
pliance with these new standards. 40 Constitutional authority in support of both
the compulsory and the retroactive features of housing codes is derived from
the well recognized obligation of the government to take reasonable and suit-
and adapt it to present day conditions and necessities by means of contract principles ...
The Modern Lease, 16 Texas L. Rev. 47, 48 (1937).
34. For a history of the reform movement in New York, see Lubove, The Progressives
and the Slums (1962). A brief account is presented by one of the participants in Mitchell,
Historical Development of the Multiple Dwelling Law, 35A McKinney's Consolidated
Laws of New York Ann. ix (1946). Typically legislation was limited to those dwellings
housing several families, i.e., multiple dwellings.
35. Tenement House Law, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1867, ch. 908.
36. A new Tenement House Act was adopted in 1901, N.Y. Sess. Laws 1901, Vol. I, ch.
334. In 1929, the Multiple Dwelling Law was enacted. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1929, ch. 713. This
was substantially recodified in 1946. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1946, ch. 950. For a detailed discussion
of the necessary provisions of such a law, see Veiller, A Model Housing Law (New York, rev.
ed. 1920).
37. The Multiple Residence Law was adopted by N.Y. Sess. Laws 1951, ch. 580,
effective July 1, 1952.
38. N.Y. Mult. Dwell. Law § 3(4); N.Y. Mult. Resid. Law § 329. To assist local
communities, the New York State Division of Housing has prepared a model housing code;
see N.Y. Div. of Housing, Model Housing Code, Vol. 2 (1960).
39. While the movement for housing reform has roots deep into the nineteenth
century, it is only in the years since World War 11 that housing codes have become common.
As recently as 1950 the National Association of Housing and Redevelopment Officials reported
that only a dozen cities had adopted such codes. Stopping Slums before they Start, 7 J.
Housing 160 (1950). By 1960, well over two hundred cities had adopted codes, and current
figures indicate that approximately 700 cities have passed housing codes. Lange, Municipal
Housing Codes, 27 Muni. Yearbook 318 (1960). For a discussion of the role of the federal
government in promoting housing codes, see Rhyne, The Workable Program-A Challenge
for Community Improvement, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob. 685 (1960); see generally, Note,
Municipal Housing Codes, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 11,15 (1956); Note, Administration and
Enforcement of the Philadelphia Housing Code, 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 437 (1958).
40. Housing codes should be distinguished from building codes which set minimum
standards for new construction and are entirely prospective in application.
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able steps to protect the health and safety of the public under the police
power.41 While housing codes have been helpful in defining minimum standards,
and in providing necessary flexibility for local individuality, they are not self-
executing.42 A considerable effort must be exerted to secure compliance within
the minimum standards they establish;43 both maintenance and repair costs
are an expensive item in the management of real property, and many owners
have been understandably reluctant to spend money without the expectation of
increasing their rate of profit. To aid in enforcement, provision for both civil
and criminal penalties are usually included within the codes, but great difficulty
has been met in using these sanctions effectively against owners who fail to
maintain safe and sanitary dwellings.44 Frequently extensive delays are en-
countered in prosecuting a landlord, and even when conviction is secured,
experience indicates that the fines imposed have been so low that numerous
recalcitrant landlords accept them as nothing more than a minor cost of doing
business.45 The ultimate objective of housing codes is to compel the repair and
rehabilitation of our existing housing resources; 46 but all too often an owner
finds it less expensive to pay a slight fine than to make needed repairs.47 A
general dissatisfaction with the effectiveness of traditional enforcement methods
has given impetus to utilizing rent withholding as a more persuasive method of
motivating owners to bring offending buildings into compliance. The Spiegel Law
has seized upon this device for the enforcement of minimum housing standards.4 8
41. Adamec v. Post, 273 N.Y. 250, 7 N.E.2d 120 (1937). In spite of the extensive
authority which can be mobilized under the police power, one commentator has suggested that
housing reformers have been shortsighted in neglecting to enlist economic sanctions which
would provide an element of self-regulation. See Dunham, Private Enforcement of City
Planning, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 463 ('1955).
42. Extensive treatment of the problems encountered in enforcing housing codes in
nine major cities is contained in the encyclopedic Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing
Codes, 78 Harv. L. Rev. 801 (1965).
43. The procedures employed in New York City were the subject of an informative
study conducted by the Community Service Society of New York. See Community Service
Society, Code Enforcement For Multiple Dwellings in New York City (1962).
44. See the detailed study, Community Service Society, Code Enforcement for Multiple
Dwellings in New York City: Enforcement Through Criminal Court Action (1965). Several
years ago, the Attorney General's New York City office began a vigorous campaign against
"incorporated slum lords." Presently the City of New York has taken over this function
under the receivership provision of N.Y. Mult. Dwelling Law § 309.
45. On August 19, 1965, the New York Times reported that the average citywide
fine had dropped 26% during the past year from $18.75 to $13.96. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
1965, p. 33, col. 1. On similar evidence Ford concluded many years ago that "judges
may . . . lack interest in or sympathy with the purpose of the law." The Enforcement of
Housing Legislation, 42 Pol. Sd. Q. 549, 558 (1927).
46. See Osgood & Zwerner, Rehabilitation and Conservation, 25 Law & Contemp. Prob.
705 (1960).
47. The futility of small fines is quite dear: "[Bly hypotheses we are trying to force
property owners not to make decisions which they regard as profitable, [and] we have
expected a fine, usually a small one, to deter such owners from making these choices."
Dunham, Private Enforcement of City Planning, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 463 (1955).
48. For a general discussion of rent withholding, see Comment, Rent Withholding and
the Improvement of Substandard Housing, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 304 (1965).
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THE SPIEGEL LAW
"Avoidance of abuses in connection with rent checks," is the express
statement of purpose contained in the Spiegel Law, 49 and additional emphasis
on the statute's role in ensuring the proper and expeditious expenditure of
public funds appears in the message of Governor Rockefeller which he issued
upon signing the bill into law. The Governor noted: "It has been estimated that
as much as $25 million of welfare funds are paid annually to landlords of sub-
standard dwellings in New York City alone." 50 To assist public agencies in
49. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b reads:
§ 143-b. Avoidance of abuses in connection with rent checks
1. Whenever a recipient of public assistance and care is eligible for or entitled
to receive aid or assistance in the form of a payment for or toward the rental of
any housing accommodations occupied by such recipient or his family, such payment
may be made directly by the public welfare department to the landlord.
2. Every public welfare official shall have power to and may withhold the
payment of any such rent in any case where he has knowledge that there exists
or there is outstanding any violation of law in respect to the building containing
the housing accommodations occupied by the person entitled to such assistance
which is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health. A report of each
such violation shall be made to the appropriate public welfare department by the
appropriate department or agency having jurisdiction over violations.
3. Every public welfare official shall have the power to initiate or to request
the recipient to initiate before the appropriate housing rent commission any proper
proceeding for the reduction of maximum rents applicable to any housing accom-
modation occupied by a person entitled to assistance in the form of a rent pay-
ment whenever such official has knowledge that essential services which such person
is entitled to receive are not being maintained by the landlord or have been sub-
stantially reduced by the landlord.
4. The public welfare department may obtain and maintain current records
of violations in buildings where welfare recipients reside which relate to conditions
which are dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health.
5. (a) It shall be a valid defense in any action or summary proceeding against
a welfare recipient for non-payment of rent to show existing violations in the
building wherein such welfare recipient resides which relate to conditions which
are dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health as the basis for non-
payment.
(b) In any such action or proceeding the plaintiff or landlord shall not be
entitled to an order or judgment awarding him possession of the premises or
providing for removal of -the tenant, or to a money judgment against the tenant,
on the basis of non-payment of rent for any period during which there was
outstanding any violation of law relating to dangerous or hazardous conditions
or conditions detrimental to life or health. For the purposes of this paragraph
such violation of law shall be deemed to have been removed and no longer out-
standing upon the date when the condition constituting a violation was actually
corrected, such date to be determined by the court upon satisfactory proof submitted
by the plaintiff or landlord.
(c) The defenses provided herein in relation to an action or proceeding against
a welfare recipient for non-payment of rent shall apply only with respect to viola-
.tions reported to the appropriate public welfare department by the appropriate
department or agency having jurisdiction over violations.
6. Nothing in this section shall prevent the public welfare department from
making provision for payment of the rent which was withheld pursuant to this
section upon proof satisfactory to it that the condition constituting a violation
was actually corrected. Where rents were reduced by order of the appropriate rent
commission, the public welfare department may make provision for payment of
the reduced rent in conformity with such order.
S0. McKinney's 1962 Sess. Laws of New York, 3678.
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obtaining their full dollar's value for rent allowances, welfare officials are au-
thorized to withhold rent payments for housing accommodations of welfare
clients who live in buildings which contain "any violation of law... which is
dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health."5 ' The welfare client is
protected from eviction under the provision of the statute which states: "It
shall be a valid defense in any action or summary proceeding against a welfare
recipient for non-payment of rent to show existing violations in the building
... as the basis for non-payment." 52
The statute, as originally adopted, contained a serious limitation upon
its ability to guarantee that public funds would not be used in support of
substandard housing. Presumably the tenant's ability to assert the statutory
defense to eviction marks the effective limits of the agency's opportunity to
withhold rent. If the defense is unavailable to the tenant and he is evicted,
the statute accomplishes very little because the agency always has the option
of moving the tenant to other quarters if that is all it wishes to do.53 Focusing,
therefore, on the availability of the statutory defense to the tenant, it is quite
apparent that the agency can be maneuvered into the position where it will be
subsidizing substandard housing, despite the avowed intention of the Spiegel
Law to prevent this. For example, assume that the landlord of a welfare client
is notified by the welfare department on January first that rent is being with-
held because hazardous violations have been discovered in his building.
During the following six months the landlord does nothing to remedy the
situation and consequently he receives no rent for this period. Then on July
fifteenth, he begins repairs which he completes shortly before the end of the
month. On August first, the landlord sues for all back rent, and because there
are no outstanding violations at the time he brings suit, the tenant has no
defense to the action under the statute. At this point the welfare department
is obliged to pay all of the back rent due the landlord for the preceeding seven
months, even though during at least six and one-half months of this time
the building constituted a hazard and the tenant was not receiving full value
for his rental dollar. Thus the Spiegel Law would have provided a means for
postponing payment of rent where hazardous violations existed, but it would
51. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(2).
52. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(g) (Supp. 1965). It is customary for the
welfare department to provide the tenant with legal representation without charge. Condi-
tions sufficiently severe to provide rent withholding would assuredly be the basis for a valid
claim of constructive eviction.
53. The right of the tenant to claim a constructive eviction and move out, and the
power of the city to order the dwelling vacated are of little practical value. As the Special
Committee on Housing and Urban Development of the Association of the Bar of the City
of New York commented, "The right to move in times of housing shortage, is an empty
right.... The power to vacate in times of housing shortage is one whose exercise is abhorred
since it damages those most in need of protection, viz. the tenants." Memorandum, 305/63/9,
at 3-4 (1963). In New York City less than 40 buildings were vacated by order of the City
in 1963. Gribetz, New York City's Receivership Law, 21 J. Housing 297 (1964). In Chicago
only 187 buildings were vacated in 1964. 1964 Chicago Dep't of Buildings Ann. Rep. 6.
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not have prevented public funds from being ultimately used in support of
unsafe housing.5 4
This defect was remedied by an amendment in 1965 which provided that
the "landlord shall not be entitled to an order or judgment awarding him
possession of the premises or providing for removal of the tenant, or to a money
judgment against the tenant, on the basis of non-payment of rent for any period
during which there was outstanding any violation of law .... "55 It may be
that the 1965 amendment was less a change in policy than an attempt to cure
a shortcoming of the original draftsmanship. There is some reason to believe
that the language added in 1965 does no more than make explicit what was
fully intended under the earlier wording.56 The final subsection of the statute
originally stated that "nothing in this section shall prevent the public wel-
fare department from making provision for payment of the rent which was
withheld pursuant to this section upon proof . . ." that the violations have
been cleared. 57 This provision may fairly be taken to mean that the depart-
ment had the discretionary authority to repay back rent once violations were
corrected, or to declare the rent forfeit.58 But if the provision is read as author-
izing abatement of back rent by the welfare department it is difficult to deter-
54. The department might avoid paying any rent at all in this hypothetical situation
if it moved the tenant shortly before repairs were completed; of course the tenant would
remain liable for all of the back rent once his defense under N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law
§ 143-b(g) was no longer available. Some indication that the welfare department will not be
liable is seen in the summary of a recent Opinion of the Attorney General, but the facts
which he had under consideration evidently involved a situation in which the violation had
not yet been removed: "A local public welfare department is not required to pay rent
pursuant to the provisions of . . . [N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b], if prior to the
conclusion of a summary proceeding to evict the tenant-recipient, the latter ceases to be a
recipient of public assistance." 1963 Ops. N.Y. Atty. Gen. 181. There has been at least one
suggestion that a welfare department persuaded a client to move, not because better quarters
were available, but because it gave the department the opportunity to save rent money which
it had withheld. But the department and the tenant may not have the last word. "The
practice has also been reported of landiords promptly evicting tenants after the repairs
have finally been made." Wald, Law and Poverty: Report to the National Conference on
Law and Poverty, 17, n.52.
55. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 701, amending N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b.
56. Apparently the official position of the City of New York was that rent abatement
was intended by the legislature. See Memorandum in Support of A.I. 720 by Paul Bragdon,
Assistant to the Mayor of the City of New York ('65 Welfare #1). The Commissioner of
the N.Y. Dep't of Bldg. held a similar view. See Gribetz, New York City's Receivership
Law, 21 J. Housing 297, 298 (1964). The Deputy Commissioner of the N.Y.C. Dep't of
Welfare has written: "It has been the policy of this Department not to authorize payment
of rent for the period when the violation was in existence, except in cases where the Court
rendered judgment for the landord and such payment was necessary to prevent eviction."
Letter From Philip Sokol, August 25, 1965. A Monroe County welfare official also reported
that he believed that the department had authority to abate rent. Letter of August 23, 1965.
57. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(6) (Supp. 1965).
58. An alternative interpretation of this section might be that it merely permits the
department to repay rent if the department elects to do so; without this section, it might
be argued that the department is not authorized to make a back payment of rent because the
department has no liability to the landlord. Its only responsibility is to the tenant's
present needs and past accommodations might not qualify as a proper expenditure of depart-
ment funds. See discussion of the lack of privity between the landlord and the welfare
department in Trozze v. Drooney, 35 Misc. 2d 1060, 1062-63, 232 N.Y.S.2d 139, 141-42
(Binghamton City Ct. 1962).
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mine how the tenant was protected against either eviction or a judgment for
back rent once the landlord corrected all outstanding violations. Whatever the
legislative intent was, some local welfare officials took the position that the
original wording of the statute authorized abatement of rent for such time as
violations actually existed. 59 The 1965 amendment made it clear that the
department now has authority to abate rent for any period that a violation has
existed, and the tenant's defense to eviction or a money judgment has likewise
been clarified.
Rent Abatement
The provision for rent abatement added by the 1965 amendment raises
two fundamental questions, one relating to its constitutionality, and the other
to its desirability. The Spiegel Law has been the subject of very little litigation
and there has been no determination of its constitutionality by an appellate
court. The lower court decisions which have upheld its constitutionality con-
strued it as authorizing nothing more than a temporary suspension of the
landlord's right to collect rent. Justice Wachtel faced the issue explicitly in
Milchman v. Rivera60 and sustained the statute against the landlord's assertion
that it imposed an unconstitutional deprivation of property without due process
of law. Concluding that the Spiegel Law constitutes a valid and proper exercise
of the police power, Justice Wachtel stated:
There is nothing so drastic or onerous in the means specified in this
act as to invalidate it, nor is there any taking of property involved
in its operation .... The landlord is not permanently deprived of his
rent. Under the law, the Welfare Department is empowered to with-
hold the rent for the benefit of the landlord until the violations which
are dangerous, hazardous and detrimental to health and safety are
removed.6 '
It is not at all clear that the provision authorizing abatement of rent and
suspension of the landlord's power to evict the tenant may be sustained. In its
original form, providing for nothing more than rent withholding, the Spiegel
Law was characterized by most commentators as being of "doubtful constitu-
tional validity";6 2 while that is probably an overly cautious evaluation, the
59. See references cited note 56, supra.
60. 39 Misc. 2d 347, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. 1963), appeal dismissed,
13 N.Y.2d 1123, 196 N.E.2d 555, .247 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1964).
61. Id. at 354-55, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 868. A similar conclusion was reached in Schaeffer
v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 730, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444, 452 (Bronx Civ. Ct. 1962). And see
Fidler v. Kurtis, 40 Misc. 2d 905, 244 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup. Ct. 1963) approving the decision
in Milchman v. Rivera. The statute was held unconstitutional in Trozze v. Drooney, 35
Misc. 2d 1060, 232 N.Y.S.2d 139 (Binghamton City Ct. 1962) apparently on the ground that
the police power may be used to promote decent housing conditions, but that "The Social
Welfare Law is not the proper vehicle to require compliance with minimum housing
standards." Id. at 1064, 232 N.Y.S.2d at 143.
62. Memorandum of the Special Committee on Housing and Urban Development of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, p. 5 (1964). That the provision
for temporary rent withholding in N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755 was held constitu-
tional would lend support that temporary withholding does not exceed the limits of due
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1965 amendment may have increased its vulnerability to constitutional attack.
In addition to the issue of constitutionality the provision for rent abate-
ment also raises important questions of policy. While it is undoubtedly a de-
sirable social goal to end public subsidization of substandard housing, it would
be unfortunate if this goal were achieved at the expense of further depletion of
our housing resources. A certain rigidity in the Spiegel Law may contribute to
this unfortunate result. It is undoubtedly true that many pieces of slum
property are owned by people with limited financial means. If these less affluent
property owners are to be encouraged to repair their buildings, they must have
access to the necessary funds, and it is quite likely that the income derived from
current rents may be indispensable to undertaking these repairs.6 3 Of course
the welfare department has the option to pay the back rents once violations
have been removed, and it is conceivable that an impecunious owner might be
able to borrow against this possibility, but even in such a case the welfare
department is left with the decision of whether or not to release the funds.
Just what factors the welfare department is to weigh in making such a deter-
mination are not indicated in the statute. Taking the hypothetical case of a
poor but well-intentioned owner as an example of a situation in which the
department might feel it served the best interest of the community to release
the funds rather than abate them, the department would still have the chore
of passing upon the bona-fides of the landlord's assertion that he cannot make
repairs without the guarantee of the eventual release of the withheld funds.
The welfare department may have experience in ferreting out the hidden assets
of relief recipients, but it is of doubtful wisdom to place this sort of decision
within the department's jurisdiction. At a minimum it will add considerably to
the department's workload. If the determination is complex or time-consuming,
it is likely that out of self-protection a rigid policy will be adopted, either in
favor of abatement or of releasing funds; in either case injustice will result
unless each case is examined on its merits.
Even in its operation as a rent withholding statute, the Spiegel Law may
be unduly restrictive. The dilemma of the impecunious landlord may well arise
in the context of rent withholding, and it is possible that the only way some
owners have of financing repairs is to pay for them out of current rents. There
is no provision under section 143-b permitting the department to release with-
held rent money prior to the complete removal of all outstanding hazardous
violations. In some circumstances the judicious release of rent money might
actually contribute to the rehabilitation of a dilapidated dwelling. If there is
a reluctance to trust the landlord to disburse withheld rent for repairs, then
process. See Emray Realty Corp. v. De Stefano, 5 Misc. 2d 352, 160 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup.
Ct. 1957).
63. The Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of N.Y., Inc., while favoring "the
principle of rent abatement" urged defeat of the amendment which authorized abatement
under N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b because it provided that "all [emphasis added]
the rent is abated" and thereby "leaves no bargaining power to be used on the landlord."
Letter of August 9, 1965.
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there should be some provision to permit either the tenant, the welfare depart-
ment, or some independent agency, such as the city buildings department, to
have access to withheld rent money for minor repairs which require immediate
attention. Such authority now exists under Real Property Actions and Proceed-
ings Law section 755 with respect to rent deposited in court in New York
City; similar flexibility should be possible under the Spiegel Law.0 4
Hazardous Conditions
In order to invoke its authority under the Spiegel Law, a welfare depart-
ment must be aware of conditions in the welfare client's building which are
"dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health." To permit a welfare
client to remain in such a building, even if the department is no longer sub-
sidizing its upkeep, may pose a more serious problem than the mere "abuse"
of rent checks which the law was designated to correct. Some thoughtful critics
have argued that any time a department of welfare invokes the Spiegel Law
it is a public admission by that department that it is not properly performing
its responsibilities as a public agency; 5 if a dwelling is dangerous, it is sug-
gested that alternative housing should be provided.00 Saving the department
the cost of paying .rent does not benefit the client, and in fact it might give
rise to a possible conflict of interest. It has been suggested that some welfare
departments might be tempted to permit families on relief to remain in unsafe
quarters in order to then use the Spiegel Law to reduce the strain on the
department's own budget.
One answer to this criticism is that in many cases the potential threat to
the tenant's health and safety would be sufficiently remote to justify continued
occupancy; for example, a department might know that a building has a
defective furnace, and yet not feel it necessary to remove a welfare client
during the summer months when the furnace would not normally be in use.
Likewise, the department might argue in all candor that the danger presented
by existing conditions is no greater than that of any other available accommoda-
tions which the department could afford to offer. But these reasonable ex-
planations of why a department might permit a welfare client to remain in a
64. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755 permits a court to stay a summary
dispossess proceeding against a tenant for non-payment of rent if an order to remove
a housing violation has been issued to the landlord and the circumstances in the building
constitute a constructive eviction, provided that the tenant deposits his rent with the court
as it falls due. In 1965, this statute was amended to provide that the court could use the rent
so deposited to pay materialmen, contractors or others whose services were essential to
the proper maintenance of *he building. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 881, adding § 755(3)
to the Real Prop. Actions Law. Prior to this amendment no person was permitted to
withdraw any money from the funds deposited during the stay.
65. One welfare department official has commented that use of the Spiegel Law
caused his agency some uneasiness: "success placed this department on notice that its welfare
clients stood in danger of life and limb [and this] caused grave concern to the department
.... " Letter of September 9, 1965.
66. For example, see Memorandum of New York County Officers Association, April
22, 1965.
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building in spite of adverse conditions raise an additional question: if the
danger is either slight or remote, is it equitable to abate the rent?67 Here
withholding would be more readily justifiable.
Degradation or Salvation
Additional objections have been leveled at the practice of singling out
welfare recipients for special treatment.68 Some social workers have contended
that the Spiegel Law centers attention upon the plight of the welfare recipient
and may tend to degrade him either by introducing a sense of inferiority or
by reinforcing whatever feelings he may already have about his own inade-
quacy.6 9 And it has been suggested that the welfare client could become a
pawn in a struggle between the welfare department and the landlord, and
suffer embarrassment at the need to appear in court to answer a dispossess
order.70 Admittedly, a welfare recipient may be placed under some emotional
strain whenever an issue is made over his housing conditions under the Spiegel
Law, but this must be balanced against the possible advantage to be gained
from bringing an increased number of dwellings into compliance with minimum
code standards. The professional staff of the welfare department is certainly
capable of determining the possible hardship and advantage in each individual
case and invoking the law only where there is a clear net gain to be had. This
same approach provides an answer to the charge that the Spiegel Law will make
it more difficult for welfare recipients to obtain housing. Some authorities fear
that landlords will not be willing to run the risk of rent withholding or abate-
ment and will therefore refuse to rent to anyone they know to be on public
assistance.71 There is evidence that in some communities it has become in-
creasingly difficult to secure rental housing for welfare families because a local
department has made vigorous use of the power conferred by the Spiegel
Law.72 But again, one may fairly assume that a local agency will be capable
67. In contrast, rent reductions authorized under the New York rent control law
may be commensurate with degree to which the tenant is deprived of the use of the premises
or of necessary services. N.Y. City Rent & Rehabilitation Law § Y51-5.0(h) (3).
68. This argument has been raised as the basis of a claim that the statute is an
unconstitutional denial of equal protection of the laws. It was rejected in Schaeffer v.
Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 728, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444, 451 (Bronx Civ. Ct. 1962), on the
ground that the classification was not arbitrary.
69. See, for example, Community Service Society of New York, Report of the Cor-
inittee on Housing and Urban Development (1962): "[I]t is degrading to recipients of
public assistance to the object of special treatment of this kind2' Id. at 19.
70. See, Community Service Society of New York, Memorandum on Housing Legisla-
tion, No. 37, March 11, 1965.
71. Community Service Society of New York, Report of the Committee on Housing
and Urban Development 62-63 (1963); Memorandum of Citizens' Union Committee on
Legislation, April 23, 1965.
72. One County Welfare official has written: "As the effectiveness of the defense
provided by the statute ... became known, landlords knowing or suspecting that they were
in violation of the ... codes . .. would not rent to welfare recipients since they knew that
we would defend them in court .... Thus developed an ironic situation, to wit: The more
successful we were in using section 143-b, the availability of housing in this community
shrunk proportionately, making our housing problem . .. more acute." Letter of September
1, 1965.
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of weighing the advantages of widespread use of the Spiegel Law against the
possible antagonisms its use generates. The state of the local rental market
will be a very significant factor in any such decision, and if the law remains
in its present form under which the local agency has full discretion, it is difficult
to foresee any necessary disadvantage to the welfare recipient.7 3
The Club of Continued Occupancy
Continued occupancy without rent payment can be a truly effective "club"
in persuading a landlord to provide his tenants with necessary services' or to
make needed repairs. But something less than the impact of this "club" may
be all that will result under the Spiegel Law. The tenant is given a statutory
defense against a money judgment or an order of eviction in a summary pro-
ceeding only in case the landlord bases his claim on non-payment of rent.
This is inadequate protection if the tenant is to be free to wield the "club"
with force. Most, if not all, welfare tenants will be living under month-to-
month tenancies and these are subject to termination upon one month's notice.
It appears that a landlord who did not wish to make repairs demanded by the
welfare department could serve a notice to vacate upon the welfare client,
and then, on the appropriate date bring suit to oust the tenant, not for non-
payment of rent, but for continuing in possession "after the expiration of -his
term, without the permission of the landlord.1
74
If the legislature intended to protect the welfare client against such an
eviction it is unfortunate that explicit mention was not included within section
143-b of the Social Welfare Law. Alternatively, provision might have been
placed in the Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, either as an excep-
tion to the class of persons who are eligible to maintain a special proceeding
under section 721, or in the form of an additional requirement under section
741 that petitioner allege that there are no hazardous violations in his building.
It is possible that the legislature believed that sufficient protection already
existed against the use of a summary proceeding to circumvent the Spiegel
Law. Perhaps reliance was placed upon the opportunity of the tenant to raise
an equitable defense. Again it may have been that the provision for a stay-
from four to six months-was deemed adequate; if this latter is the true ex-
planation, some new legislation is in order because one of the applicable
statutes has since lapsed.7 5 In any case the Spiegel Law is not clear in plugging
this possible loophole and there is some reason for apprehension if the land-
lord seeks to evict the tenant for holding over after the expiration of his term.7 0
73. Reports from New York City, Oneida County and Nassau County indicate that
no increase in the difficulty of finding housing for welfare recipients has been observed.
See letters of August 30, 1965 and September 8, 1965.
74. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 711(1). For possible defenses to such an action,
see Schoshinski, Remedies of the Indigent Tenant: Proposal for Change, 54 Geo. L.J.
519 (1966).
75. N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law §§ 751, 753; the former section, applicable outside
the City of New York, lapsed following September 1, 1964.
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Departmental Discretion
There was considerable ambiguity in the Spiegel Law as originally enacted
concerning the precise role the welfare department was to play in determining
what housing conditions were sufficiently hazardous to warrant rent withhold-
ing. The statute states that a public welfare official may act "in any case
where he has knowledge that there exists or there is outstanding any. violation
of law . . . which is dangerous, hazardous or detrimental to life or health. A
report of each such violation shall be made to the appropriate public welfare
department by the appropriate department or agency having jurisdiction over
violations." 77 Was a welfare official limited in his authority to those "violations
of law" which were reported to him by an "appropriate" department, or was
this last sentence added to assist the welfare department rather than to restrict
its discretion? The answer may depend upon whether any significance is
attached to the use of the alternative terms "exists or is outstanding" in the
preceding sentence. Assuming that a mere redundancy was not intended, it is
possible to conclude that violations are "outstanding" only when an appropriate
agency (a health or buildings department most likely) has taken official action,
but that a violation "exists" whenever it in fact occurs. If this is the proper
construction of this section, then the welfare department has full authority to
determine when a violation of a housing code or other health or safety law
takes place. In some circumstances this might require technical competence
not normally possessed by welfare workers, although in most cases it may be
assumed that the welfare official would not act on any but the most obvious
violations without consultation with appropriate technicians from other depart-
ments. But even if it be concluded that the welfare department is limited to
those violations reported to it by "appropriate agencies," the statute still leaves
it up to the welfare official to determine which of the reported violations are
serious enough to constitute a condition "dangerous, hazardous or detrimental
to life or health; "78 such a determination must be made because only these
serious violations will authorize the department to withhold rent. It seems
reasonable to entrust both the decision as to whether a violation exists in a
building and "whether it is hazardous to the appropriate technical departments
rather than calling upon the welfare official to develop this added 79 competency.
76. Welfare officials in Monroe County and Nassau County have pointed to this flaw and
suggested that it be remedied. See letters of August 23, 1965 and September 9, 1965.
Perhaps this defect was overlooked because tenants in New York City are protected against
such evictions under the City's rent control regulations. N.Y. City Rent & Rehabilitation
Law § Y51-6.0.
77. N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(2).
78. For objections to the vague standards and extensive authority given to welfare
officials, see Community Service Society of N.Y., Report of the Committee on Housing and
Urban Development 62-63 (1963); Memorandum of Citizens' Union Committee on Legisla-
tion, April 23, 1965.
79. See Kuperberg v. Rivera, N.Y.LJ., Jan. 14, 1963, p. 17, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. 1963) for
the view that only the Buildings Department was authorized to declare a violation
dangerous.
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A welfare official should be able to obtain a speedy inspection by an allied
department to prevent undue delay, and a determination by fully qualified
technicians would be more persuasive should the landlord institute judicial
proceedings to test the welfare department's decision to withhold rent.80
Some of this ambiguity has been removed by a 1965 amendment which
provides that the defense given by the statute "shall apply only with respect
to violations reported to the appropriate public welfare department by the
appropriate department or agency having jurisdiction over violations." 81 The
amendment, while restricting the department to those violations reported to it,
does not clearly state who has the responsibility for determining which of the
reported violations qualify as sufficiently hazardous for action by welfare
officials. A direction by the legislature that the "appropriate department" pre-
pare a list of hazardous violations for use by welfare officials as a guide, or
that each violation reported to the welfare department be designated as "hazard-
ous" or "non-hazardous" would remove any remaining ambiguity.
Extending Protection
If a hazardous violation is found anywhere in the building which houses a
welfare client the department is authorized to invoke the Spiegel Law; it is not
necessary that the violation occur in a portion of the building occupied by the
welfare client. Thus the statute covers situations not within the protection tradi-
tionally offered under constructive eviction; to claim a constructive eviction
the tenant must show some actual interference with the use and enjoyment of
the premises he occupies. It is conceivable that under a literal reading of the
Spiegel Law a violation in an unoccupied portion of the building might justify
rent withholding. A violation might be of such a nature that it presented a
hazard to anyone coming in contact with it, but entirely irrelevant to all
others. For example, a defective fire escape leading from a third story rear
apartment might constitute a hazard to anyone living in the apartment from
which the fire escape provides an emergency exit, but it is doubtful that it
would actually threaten the health or safety of a welfare client who lived in
the ground floor front apartment. And if the third floor rear apartment was
temporarily vacant, the violation would still exist, yet in a portion of the
building actually unused and totally unrelated to the safety of the first floor
welfare tenant. In defending the applicability of section 143-b to the entire
building in which a welfare tenant resides one court has commented: "The
purpose of the law to eradicate slums is not adequately served by conditions
80. One county welfare official has reported delay up to 21% months in obtaining the
cooperation of the technical staff of the buildings department. See letter of August 23, 1965.
Another welfare official reports that "we couldn't ask caseworkers to make any official deter-
mination because they are not, by training, building inspectors." The buildings department
was relied upon for inspections and there was no difficulty in obtaining cooperation. See
letter of February 12, 1964.
81. N.Y. Sess. Laws 1965, ch. 701, adding N.Y. Soc. Welfare Law § 143-b(S) (c).
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which may exist in a particular apartment only."82 Another court has explained
the need for such extensive power by referring to the shortage of housing
available to welfare recipients; presumably more buildings will be repaired
under the impact of the statute's broad sweep, thus increasing the availability
of adequate housing.8 3 It is suggested that some relationship between the viola-
tion noted and the safety of the welfare client should be clearly demonstrable
if the statute is to retain its validity as a reasonable means of protecting against
abuses in rent checks. In most cases such a relationship will not be difficult to
establish, and limiting the statute to such violations should not seriously impair
its effectiveness.
Tenants' Responsibilities
Landlords of slum properties have long contended that their own tenants
constitute one of the chief causes of deteriorating conditions in their buildings.
When a tenant is responsible for causing a hazardous condition in his building
it would appear that the welfare department is still within its authority to
withhold rent until the landlord makes the necessary repairs. In this situation
the landlord has strong reason to oust the tenant out of self-protection, but
until he can effect such ouster section 143-b offers a potential bar to his
authority to collect rent. This is not to suggest that the landlord should not
have the primary responsibility for making repairs, even those made necessary
by the conduct of his tenants. The wellbeing of others in the building may
depend upon repairs being made at once, and a hazardous condition does not
become less of a threat because it is caused by the tenant rather than by the
landlord or a third party. Perhaps wise judicial construction would avoid the
somewhat incongruous result of withholding rent when the welfare tenant him-
self has caused the damage, but other statutes make this exception explicit
and its omission here might lead to an inconsistent result if not to an unjust
one.
84
It appears that the legislature intended to place the authority to withhold
rents in the welfare department's hands and not to authorize an individual
welfare recipient to act on -his own behalf.8 5 This conclusion is drawn from
the fact that the first section of the Spiegel Law authorizes welfare departments
to make direct payments of rent to the client's landlord and four of the re-
82. Milchman v. Rivera, 39 Misc. 2d 347, 357, 240 N.Y.S.2d 859, 870 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1963).
83. Schaeffer v. Montes, 37 Misc. 2d 722, 728, 233 N.Y.S.2d 444, 450 (N.Y.C. Civ.
Ct. 1962).
84. See, for example, N.Y. Real Prop. Actions Law § 755(1): "The court shall in no
case grant a stay where it appears that the condition . . . has been created by the wilfull
or negligent act of the tenant or his agent." The same requirement appears in N.Y. Real
Prop. Actions Law, Article 7-A. The lack of such a restriction was one of the reasons that
the County Officers Ass'n objected to the Spiegel Bill. See N.Y. County Officers Ass'n, Memo
of April 22, 1965; Community Service Society of N.Y., Report of the Committee on Housing
and Urban Development (1963) raises the same point. Id. at 62-63.
85. This is the view taken in Fidler v. Kurtis, 40 Misc. 2d 905, 244 N.Y.S.2d 77 (Sup.
Ct. 1963).
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maining five sections describe the way in which the department is to carry out
authorized rent withholding. The only basis for suggesting that the statute im-
powers a welfare client to withhold rent on his own initiative is the language
in subsection 5 which provides the client with a defense to eviction or a money
judgment for non-payment of rent. This section does not say that departmental
withholding alone may give rise to the defense; rather it says that the defense
exists whenever a hazardous violation exists in the client's building. Taken by
itself subsection 5 apparently would permit a client to withhold rent, providing
there is a record of the violation in the welfare department office. Assuming
that the statute in its present form does not authorize the welfare client to
withhold rent without the consent of the welfare department, it is appropriate
to consider the advisibility of adopting an amendment to permit this. There is
considerable evidence that one of the major obstacles to effective enforcement
of housing codes is the bureaucracy and inertia encountered in the city depart-
ments responsible for taking action. Undoubtedly welfare departments are also
plagued by these debilitating influences, in addition to being understaffed.
Therefore, it would appear appropriate to permit the welfare client to have
the opportunity to act on his own behalf and to be authorized to withhold rent
in those cases where the department fails to act. Sufficient safeguards could
be imposed to prevent the client from receiving a windfall in case his assistance
allowance includes an allocation for rent, and to avoid the risk that the client
might squander the withheld rent and not have funds available to compensate
the landlord if a court should rule that the facts relied on were not sufficient
to justify withholding. If the welfare recipient were required to deposit any rent
withheld in court, similar to the practice followed under section 755 of the
Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law, there would be little danger of
these kinds of abuse. It is quite possible that the effectiveness of the Spiegel
Law would be increased if individual welfare clients were given some measure
of authority to act in their own behalf, and adequate safeguards could be
devised to prevent serious interference with either the landlord's rights or the
department's prerogatives.
LAW IN ACTION
In view of the possible problems which analysis of the Spiegel Law raises
it is interesting to note how successfully it has functioned during the first two
years since its adoption. In response to letters of inquiry sent to welfare depart-
ments in eight major urban centers in the state, reports have been in unanimous
agreement that the Spiegel Law has been assisting welfare departments obtain
improved housing conditions for their clients. 80 Several agencies have reported
86. Typical comments upon the effectiveness of the Spiegel Law include: " . . § 143-b
has been one of the most significant acts of Social Welfare Legislation to come out of
Albany in quite some time . . ."; ". . . the law is accomplishing what it was intended to
bring about .. ."; "the initial effect of § 143-b was a very good one since it dramatically
brought to the attention of everyone concerned that the law was concerned with properties
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that some new difficulty has been encountered in securing housing for welfare
clients because landlords are reluctant to rent to families under the protection
of this law,87 but all report that the existence of the law has made it much
easier to persuade landlords to make needed repairs. The suggestion that rent
will be withheld has served as a successful "discourager of hesitancy" and pro-
vided the welfare workers with additional leverage for their day-to-day negotia-
tions with landlords. The paucity of litigation concerning the statute probably
reflects the fact that welfare departments generally do not invoke the Spiegel
Law unless they believe that there is substantial likelihood that a landlord will
actually be induced to make the necessary repairs. Where there is little likeli-
hood that a landlord will respond cooperatively, either because of financial
inability or recalcitrance, the usual practice is to move the welfare client and
avoid a prolonged controversy. While its mettle has not yet been fully tested
on the "hard" cases, thoughtful use of the Spiegel Law has met with over-
whelming approval of those responsible for its enforcement.
In assessing the importance of the Spiegel Law, its influence upon the
orientation of welfare workers should not be overlooked. Social workers have
been accused of demonstrating "a long history of indifference to the physical
elements of welfare such as housing."'88 The alleged indifference is accounted for,
in part, by the increasingly psychiatric approach of contemporary caseworkers.
If this charge is accurate the Spiegel Law may have a significant influence in
reversing this tradition. The statute calls to the profession's attention the re-
sponsibility which it must assume in the campaign for improving the housing
conditions of the poor. From the frequency with which the Spiegel Law has
been used in the past two years there is every reason to believe that social
workers are now demonstrating a concern for housing conditions.8 9 If the
statute has contributed to this interest, it is a significant accomplishment.
CONCLUSION
Noting the impact which the need for resources planning has had upon
traditional concepts of property law, one perceptive scholar has commented
that the change has come "from piecemeal attack on fragments of an over-all
that were in violation"; "It has had a general effect of increasing compliance with city
inspections."
These letters of inquiry were sent to officials of all 57 social welfare districts of the
state. Following response to this initial inquiry, further investigation was concentrated on
those districts reporting that deteriorating housing conditions created a serious problem.
87. See authorities cited in note 62, supra.
88. Wood, Social Welfare Planning, 352 The Annals 119, 123 (1964). Perhaps this is
one of the incidental benefits which Haar had in mind when, speaking of the master plan, he
said: "... as is the case with the administering of many regulatory devices, more important
in final tally than the impact of sanction is the educational influence of the regulatory
program." Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 353, 363 (1955).
89. Informal estimates are that as of September, 1965, rent had been withheld in
approximately 850 cases outside New York City where there were over 5,000 reported
instances in 1964 alone.
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problem .... ,0o In the past four years New York has adopted several statutes
aimed at increasing the effectiveness of housing code enforcement, and the
Spiegel Law is certainly a meaningful contribution toward this goal. But legis-
lative attempts have been fragmented, and as yet there has been no com-
prehensive effort to adopt legislation which is aimed at a coordinated attack
on the problem. The Spiegel Law, as noted in this comment, contains features
which differ in several respects from other legislation recently adopted in
New York and there is no clear explanation for these differences in standards
or in approach. The practice of providing one set of remedies for residents of
New York City and another for those who live elsewhere in the state generally
has been continued. In authorizing statewide applicability, the Spiegel Law
marks a noted exception to this tradition but this only emphasizes the piece-
meal quality of the legislative effort. It may be that the problems of New York
City are still so distinctive that remedies which are moderate and reasonable
there would be drastic and excessive elsewhere in the state. The growth of slums
and the steady deterioration of housing conditions outside of New York City
suggest that the problem is statewide and that more adequate remedies must
be made available to other cities. Recently, New York City has authorized a
comprehensive research program to find a substitute to its piecemeal and frag-
mented approach to code enforcement.0 1 The Spiegel Law is a significant move
toward establishing statewide policies for housing problems. After this hopeful
beginning, it would now be appropriate for the legislature to consider a compre-
hensive reappraisal of state laws on housing code enforcement.
90. Cross, The Diminishing Fee, 20 Law & Contemp. Prob. 517, 529 (1955).
91. Research on this project is being conducted by the Legislative Drafting Research
Fund of Columbia University Law School.
